The question of the metaphysical status of the laws of physics has received increased attention in recent years. Perhaps most well-known among this work are David Lewis's Humean supervenience and Nancy Cartwright's dispositionalism, both of which reject the classical conception of the laws of physics as necessary and real independent of the objects they govern, arguing instead that what we call laws are shorthand for the regularities of local states of affairs (on Lewis's account) or the dispositions of objects (on Cartwright's). The properties of necessity and reality are generally taken to go hand-in-hand when physical laws are concerned; however, this leaves aside the possibility that the laws of physics are independently real (i.e. not just a description of regularities of objects) yet contingent. This paper will explore this third option which is found in the work of Quentin Meillassoux. We will ask: if laws both exist independent of their objects and are contingent, what happens when laws change? Specifically, the possibility of metaphysical retro-causation becomes a live option. This raises both questions of the ontological status of the past as well as our epistemic access to the past after a change in physical laws. Meillassoux's ontology of hyper-chaos weathers this challenge with its consistency intact; however, it is an open question of whether or not saving the reality of physical laws by sacrificing their necessity is worth the epistemic limits and metaphysical strangeness that it implies.
Introduction
The work of Quentin Meillassoux set out in After Finitude is an attempt to inoculate thought against idealism by radicalizing the correlate between thinking and being. 'Speculative materialism', as Meillassoux calls his project, is intended to, among other things, provide a justification for scientific realism and the mathematization of primary qualities. This is the first step of Meillasoux's attempt to restore "the great outdoors" of speculation beyond the correlate of thinking and being to philosophy.1 With the proper goals of his work in mind, I will show that the ontological conclusion of Meillassoux's argument, the state of hyper-chaos, is in conflict with his criteria for a legitimate grounding of science. To do this, I must first show that Meillassoux is committed to a realism of physical laws in that his arguments cannot hold without physical laws independent of what they govern. I will then argue that the implications of this realism about physical laws coupled with Meillassoux's ontology of hyper-chaos actually prevents him from being able to meet his stated criteria of success against the aporia of the arche-fossil: that the theory have the possibility of interpreting diachronic statements of science literally.
Arche-fossil, unreason, and hyper-chaos
In order to carry out this examination, there are three pieces of Meillassoux's text that must be set out: the test of the arche-fossil, the principle of unreason, and the ontology of hyper-chaos. Meillassoux's critique of correlationism begins with the test of the arche-fossil. The correlationist, on Meillassoux's account, encompasses any number of philosophical positions which append a 'for us' to statements about being. The result of this 'for us' is to bar us from making statements about thought separate from being and vice versa. While there are any number of proposed correlations (e.g. consciousness as always 'consciousness of' for the Husserlian, language for the Wittgensteinian, paraphrase into classical First Order Logic for the logical positivist, and so on), they function in the same way2 in that they take a statement about the external world, say that the universe is roughly 13.5 billion years old, and append a qualification which relates the statement to the speaker of the statement, "the universe is 13.5 billion years old, for us" or "as it appears to us."3 The ancestrality of the example chosen is paramount as such a statement lands in an absurdity if we append the correlationist's 'for us.' To do so would be to make the sense of the ancestral statement depend on the way in which human observers are correlated to the world; the beginning of the universe is somehow only a beginning 'for us. ' In being for us, we would then be a precursor to or a condition of the beginning of the universe. Embarrassingly for the correlationist, they find themselves not far from young earth creationists on Meillassoux's accounting. 4 Meillassoux presses further on. It is not simply knowledge of the past that is ultimately a problem for correlationists, but the knowledge of a past wherein givenness or observation are impossible. The question of how ancient Greek phalanx combat played out would not be an arche-fossil because while it is a matter of some controversy, the sense of a statement about ancient combat does not challenge the conditions of givenness to a consciousness. Phalanx warfare was certainly given to a Spartan general surveying a battlefield at some point, and we can easily construct a counterfactual of the type "if a person were to see phalanx combat, it would appear as X" without falling into an absurdity. The birth of the universe, on the other hand, fundamentally challenges correlationism because of the sheer impossibility of witnessing such an event. 5 This bars the attempt of the correlationist to retroject a correlation between thought and being before the appearance of consciousness in the universe. The arche-fossil objection posits a time at which experience is impossible. There is then no true counterfactual constructible because the conditions of the early universe are such that the consequent (the event would appear as X to the observer) is always false. This is the only possible condition which preserves the literal sense of ancestral statement: there must have been a time before consciousness, and therefore, before anything was manifest to consciousness as such. 6
With the condition for literal ancestral statements affirmed, we can specify Meillassoux's criteria for a legitimate justification of the sciences: we must be able to interpret scientific statements literally, as the scientist herself would speak them. " [A] n ancestral statement only has sense if its literal sense is also its ultimate sense."7 In other words, the scientific statement must not have the caveat of "from the point of view of the researcher," or of reducing the strangeness of ancestral statements to pseudo-problems arising from the misuse of language. The same concerns apply equally to any statement about a future time without consciousness (e.g. near the heat death of the universe). The arche-fossil is equally a mellofossil. In summation, the arche-fossil demands an understanding of the senses of some statements which do not correlate to an observer (the truth of such statements is another matter); we must understand such statements without covertly retrojecting or projecting a correlate which would make their sense observer 2 Meillassoux relates these different correlations to three positions based on how they deal with the in-itself apart from us. These positions are weak correlationism, strong correlationism, and absolute idealism. relative. As they are uncorrelated, Meillassoux calls such statements 'absolute.'8 The arche-fossil then shows us that absolutes are thinkable despite not being given to an observer or able to be manifest to a consciousness.
Meillassoux's own response to the arche-fossil and the think-ability of the absolute is to formulate the 'principle of unreason' from the positive affirmation that everything is thinkable otherwise than it is given: "everything in the world is without reason and is thereby capable of becoming otherwise without reason."9 If everything is radically contingent, then it could be otherwise without reason. If there is no reason why something is one way rather than another, then we are unable to provide a reason for statements before the time of consciousness which would ground them; we can only make these statements without caveats or idealist justifications.10 The principle of unreason implies the falsity of the principle of sufficient reason, though it is not a purely negative claim about the inability of human beings to discover such a reason. Instead, Meillassoux's claim is a direct one: being lacks reason and becomes otherwise without reason. The questions 'why is the world the way it is rather than otherwise' and 'what makes the world the way it is' are emptied of any possible answer. Inversely, the limit of metaphysical possibility is extended greatly by the principle of unreason, well beyond the commonly accepted limit of conceivability: "for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real."11 Unbridled speculation is then the proper epistemological ground of the sciences (though not their desired result) since no appeal can be made to a necessary, unchanging being on which to ground a theory a priori.12
Finally, if we affirm the principle of unreason as bearing on the world itself (as Meillassoux does since to affirm it of thought alone would find us back in correlationism), then we must conclude that the ontological state of the world is one of hyper-chaos. Hyper-chaos requires us to think the radical possibility of the otherwise. No state of affairs is necessary, and there can be no reason for why states of affairs change. Any reason for change would amount to smuggling in meta-laws or a necessary reason for contingency, but it is the contingency itself that is necessary.13 One must not misunderstand hyper-chaos as Heraclitean flux. Rather, it is an ontological state which allows for the possibility of madcap flux which undoes all that is in a blink of the eye as much as it allows for a psuedo-Parmenidean stasis in which not even the appearance of change takes place for what may as well be an eternity. As Harman puts it, "[h]yper-chaos is so contingent that even flux is contingent."14 With these in place, it is possible to show that Meillassoux's description of these ontological features and his defense against what he calls frequentialist objections15 commits him to a realism, and more specifically, an anti-humeanism about physical laws.
Hyper-chaos and realism about physical laws
First, we must ask if Meillassoux's realism about physical laws is merely apparent and an infelicitous way of describing the state of hyper-chaos. This amounts to asking whether this imparted realism about laws can be excused away as loose talk on Meillassoux's part. The traditional Humean (a la David Lewis) or the non-8 Ibid., 28. 9 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 53. Original Emphasis. Meillassoux claims to deduce the principle of unreason from the givenness of the correlate (and holds that anything given is thinkable as possibly given otherwise, which he calls its facticality). Meillassoux moves from within the correlate to the principle of unreason by arguing that no reason for the correlate nor any necessity entity on which it depends can be given; the correlate is simply a fact with no further justification. This entails that the correlate can be thought as otherwise than it is. This is affirmed of not just the correlate, but of being itself, because to maintain the fixity of being upon the mutable fact of the correlate would be without any legitimate warrant. The details of this argument are unimportant for this paper. For Meillassoux argument, see chapter three of After Finitude. For a reconstruction of the move from the critique of correlationism to the principle of unreason, see Harman Quentin Meillassoux, realist (such as Cartwright's dispositionalism) view takes the talk of laws to be shorthand for the apparent regularities of experience, data sets, the things themselves, or whatever metaphysical posits to which the theory itself is committed. What matters for the non-realist is that physical laws are not ontologically primitive or simple; they are the epiphenomenal effects of whatever is taken as primitive (for Lewis, local states of affairs, points in the Humean mosaic). Like the non-realist, Meillassoux does indeed have a critique of physical laws, but only of their necessary status and their supposed immutability, not of their existence or universal scope, nor can he paraphrase them away as parasitic on local states of affairs (we will see why below). This distinguishes between the Humean and other reductionist accounts of laws on the one side and the classical realist's account of physical laws as necessary on the other.
Meillassoux's critique, made against the frequentialist position (the position that, if laws were mutable, then they would change frequently or at least with some assignable probability), leads to a real separation between entities and the laws that govern them. To see this, we must note that Meillassoux affirms what he first entertains as critique from the frequentialist: "that not only things but also physical laws are really contingent."16 The frequentialist, however, is one who goes on to conclude that such a state of affairs is unlikely because we have never seen such changes. "This implication proceeds from the contingency of laws -which is to say, from the possibility of their alteration -to the actual frequency of their alteration."17 We saw above that Meillassoux affirms not just flux but also radical stasis as possible within hyper-chaos. The frequentialist attempts to add probabilities to these events to rule out Meillassoux's position as not a priori false, but as highly unlikely, so reasonably falsifiable given the evidence of the fixity of physical laws. To defend against this and explicate his position, Meillassoux makes use of Cantor's theorem to show that such an assignment of probabilities is impossible at the level of contingent laws.
Meillassoux's argument against the frequentialist position is based on his connection between mathematics and modality which claims "that whatever is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible."18 This role of mathematics as the delimitation of possibility allows him to move from the principle of unreason to the conclusion that anything shown to be mathematizable is both contingent and speculatively affirmable as a real possibility (and the mathematizability of physical laws has been uncontroversial since the birth of modern physics, whether they be our current physical laws or some other mathematically consistent group of laws). The argument amounts to equating the possible with the mathematizable,19 and showing that because of the non-totalizability of transfinite sets, the possible is itself non-totalizable (i.e. the power set can always be taken).20 Without a totalization of the possible, there is no denominator out of which to calculate the probability of an occurrence at the level of the universe as a whole (i.e. at the level of laws of nature). By undermining the frequentialist appeal to probability at the level of laws, Meillassoux has established not just the possibility of radical flux but also of "laws which are contingent, but stable beyond all probability."21
This argument against the totalizability of the possible is the subject of some scrutiny by readers of Meillassoux. Meillassoux himself admits that this argument provides only a disjunction between a totalized set of possibilities and possibility as untotalizable (though he takes the controversy itself alongside the existence of different axiomatizations of set theory which disagree as evidence for the latter claim).22 First, it is pointed out by Livingston that Meillassoux has not specified a connection between totalizability and probability.23 While it is the case that Meillassoux is vague on the details, the claim that the transfinite nature of the logical and mathematical tools (particularly probability and calculus) we use in the sciences to formalize theories is in tension with the finite nature of observation is not a claim unique to Meillassoux. For instance, Hempel formulates this as particularly pernicious for empiricism in that finite observation cannot be justifiably used as evidence for a transfinite mathematical formulation (such as any function which takes the real numbers as inputs). This leads Hempel to propose that either we develop a finitist probability theory, or we reject the principal claims of verificationism24 (the latter being clearly consistent with Meillassoux's critique of correlationism). Meillassoux can be seen to be pushing Hempel's worry a step further from the tension between the finitude of observation and transfinitude of mathematics to the different orders of transfinitude (cardinality) between the probable and the possible such that the former cannot be applied to the latter.
These complications of cardinality are also not without controversy as Heller and Cogburn point out that, like the relation between totalizability and probability in Livingston, Meillassoux does not specify the relation between sets and possibility.25 To ameliorate this, Heller and Cogburn re-present Meillassoux's argument as a variety of Kaplan's paradox in modal logic. Put simply, Kaplan identifies a contradiction in the relation between worlds and propositions and their cardinalities. Assume the set S of all possible worlds has cardinality k. Each subset of S is a proposition, and so we have, by the power set operation, 2k propositions. We can then specify a world where, for each proposition in the power set of S, that proposition and only that proposition is true. This would be a one-to-one correspondence, and so we have a set of worlds of cardinality 2k, contradicting our initial assumption as, by Cantor's theorem, a set cannot have a one-to-one correspondence with its own power set.26 Glossing Meillassoux's argument this way, that the set of all possibilities is ill-defined and thereby untotalizable on pain of contradiction,27 entails the falsity of the frequentialist claim that if it were possible for the laws of physics to change, probabilistically speaking, we would have seen evidence of such changes by now.28
In rebuffing the frequentialist criticism, Meillassoux has landed on an ontological distinction between the laws of nature, which are contingent, and the events or entities they govern, which are subject to chance.29 This radical distinction between contingency30 and chance is so pronounced and fundamental to Meillassoux's ontology that Harman goes as far as to call this a two worlds theory.31 At the level of entities or events, we have what Meillassoux refers to as chance. Chance here means that an event can be assigned a probability based the current laws of physics. This is possible because within a world, or even some small set (in the technical sense) of possible worlds, we can quantify over the given possibilities, and so can reasonably assign a probability measure to events. These probabilities are taken to be objective rather than subjective; it really is the case that each side of a twenty-sided die has a five percent likelihood of landing face up, given that the laws of physics remain as they currently are. This is the deepest account of probability possible for Meillassoux as the changing of the laws of physics cannot be assigned a probability and so cannot modify our knowledge of objective probabilities of events beyond the adding of the proviso "for our current laws." Events that accord with the current laws are called potential.
Opposed to chance, Meillassoux calls the state of laws in a hyper-chaotic universe contingency. We may give an account of chance: the vase cracked due to its fragility and to the force of gravity; contingency, on the other hand, exhibits the full force of the principle of unreason and the non-totalizability of the possible. A change in the laws of physics happens necessarily without reason. Contingency is the ground of 30 Up until now, the words 'contingent' and 'contingency' have been used loosely to mean not necessary; here they take on a somewhat more technical meaning for Meillassoux. 31 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 62. virtuality,32 those events that do not accord with the current state of the universe but nevertheless remain absolutely possible.
This distinction between chance and contingency is the heart of Meillassoux's contingent realism about physical laws. Though the laws of physics may change, nothing may 'break' those laws. Harman's example is enlightening: "If, instead of smashing on the floor, the vase flies into the sky or silently hovers, this is not because the vase breaks a law of nature, but because the law of nature changed suddenly and without warning."33 According to Meillassoux, the universe is hyper-chaotic, but it does not make exceptions. Thereby, any event which contradicts our previous probabilistic understanding may well be evidence of a change at the level of physical laws themselves; we may be witness to an event beyond chance. Insofar as an event counter to chance is only ever sign heralding new physical laws and not a rupture in the governing role of physical laws as such, laws function as universally as on any traditional realist account. It is this fascinating and strange contingency of real laws which leads us to the problems of retro-causation.
Realism, hyper-chaos, and consistency
Given the realism of physical laws (that laws exist as independent entities which define the possible ways entities can be otherwise), we must explore what it would mean for a hyper-chaotic event to take place. A hyper-chaotic event may be thought of as a miracle but without a god who performs the miracle in that it is an event which breaks with the supposed causal order (which is possible due to the contingency of laws) and perhaps reorders causality itself. This question must be made explicit, as to simply ask for a hyper-chaotic event would be too vague; anything that happens, for Meillassoux, is a hyper-chaotic event in the trivial sense that it is an event in a hyper-chaotic ontology, regardless of how regular it is. By notable hyper-chaotic event, I mean to denote a real occurrence which blatantly contradicts given understandings of contemporary science in a domain which is considered well understood. For instance, a sudden change to the functioning of dark matter would not meet this definition as dark matter (if it exists as more than the postulate of current physical theories) is not well understood. Nor would any slight perturbation which could be waved away as an uncertainty in a measurement. If a notable hyper chaotic event was witnessed by scientists working in a field relevant to the occurrence, they would immediately set to work on its analysis.
The relevant question is what the implications are given the role that laws play in this event for Meillassoux. There are three possible ways in which a hyper-chaotic event could bear on a realism about physical laws. 1: a change in the physical laws of the universe will alter all future occurrences relevant to those laws, but have no effect on the past, which amounts to an epistemological problem, much like a legal system with an ex post facto protection, 2: the change in laws alters the past along with the future in an act of retro-causation, which amounts to an ontological problem, and 3: the same situation as 2 except that the retro-causation does not alter the scientific understanding of the past. We can exclude the possibility where a hyper-chaotic event happens, but the laws return immediately to normal and the event has no effect on the universe or the work of scientists, not because it is not possible (by the principle of unreason, it is perfectly possible), but because the lack of meta-laws in hyper-chaos means we'd be dealing with two hyper-chaotic events (the alteration to the law, and the return to the old law). As a more complex case, this would be reducible to either of the previous three possibilities, or, more difficultly, perhaps as a combination thereof because nothing guarantees that two hyper-chaotic events would happen in the same way.
The first possibility could be called the problem of the static past. The problem is not that we would be unable to take the new scientific description of the past literally, but that we would have two literal understandings of the past with only experiment to adjudicate between the two. There is only one possible outcome given normal functioning scientific practice: the new description of the laws of nature will reflect neither actual state of affairs. The ontological situation is such that a set of laws governed all relevant 32 Meillassoux's notion of virtuality should not be confused with the more common Deleuzian notion. There are a multitude of differences, but centrally, Deleuze's virtual exists and operates here and now, whereas in-existence, the to-come, and its 'maybeing' are the features of Meillassoux's virtuality. 33 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 62. phenomena up to a point, then, suddenly, a new set take over. The epistemological situation, however, will be blind to this moment if that moment has no discernible account (in other words, this happens without a reason, or recourse to a meta-law describing the change).34 Because the scientist will necessarily be blind to this moment of alteration, we will instead be left with a description of laws which, in attempting to fit two different sets of phenomena, will be unable to account for either actual set accurately. Assume any regularity in the universe suddenly changes, and scientists have access to a wealth of data both before and after the change. This would lead to the production of mathematical descriptions which fit both sets of data. This description could not be accurate to either set. The attempt to make sense of our universe would then lead to those laws being retro-jected to the past. Finally, we would have a literal statement about the past, but an inaccurate one. This does not outright contradict Meillassoux's criteria, which was only that a literal interpretation be possible, not that the scientific statement be true, correct, or verifiable. Nonetheless, this is a heavy price to accept, and could hardly be called a scientific realism.
Possibilities 2 and 3 both hinge on different ways in which the past may not remain static and the problems thereby entailed. The term 'retro-causation' should prima facie raise concerns when applied to Meillassoux as he problematizes causation. However, given Meillassoux's realism about physical laws (i.e. physical laws are treated as ontological entities separate from the phenomena they govern, not epistemological entities which describe states of affairs), the question of whether or not the changing of laws affects the past is a live question. Nothing about Meillassoux's account of an absolute time denies this possibility.35 For lack of a more felicitous term, I will use retro-causation to denote the state of the past becoming consistent with the coming to be of a new physical law or laws. It should be noted that this form of retro-causality differs significantly from that of thinkers such as Huw Price, for whom retro-causality is a possible state of affairs inferable from the laws of Quantum Mechanics themselves (most notably Bell's Inequalities and the No Hidden Variables theorems).36 For Price and his ilk, retro-causality is an interpretation and explanation of quantum weirdness; it is therefore a physical claim and an intra-theoretical claim. Meillassoux, on the other hand, is discussing an ontological state which would undergird any scientific theory whatsoever. This separation is maintained not to reject a possible connection between these two types of retro-causation, but to clarify the ontological sort that will be discussed below. Here, I remain agnostic as to whether or not one form of retro-causality implies the other.
Returning to Meillassoux, since the details are scarce in After Finitude, one must assume that if literally understood scientific statements are such a sticking point for Meillassoux that scientists would continue to work in a similar manner even if all scientists simultaneously accepted Meillassoux's speculative materialism as the justification for their practices. If this is the case, then the evidence of the past would give us no insight into the past that existed previous to the hyper-chaotic event. This would be an ontological occlusion of the previous past by the current, retroactively caused past. In other words, a set of events brought us to the moment of the hyper-chaotic event, the previous past, and after the event, these events are retroactively replaced by a new set of events, events which seem to exist as the past, but which have not taken place, or more strangely, have had only taken place after the hyper-chaotic event. After the event, the previous past would be undiscoverable by the scientist. Comic book fans will find this familiar.
One could imagine a response from Meillassoux to this point: the scientist may not be able to discover the occluded previous-past in the lab, but that does not stop the speculative philosopher from discovering it. In fact, in formulating this very objection, I have done just that. One might blush at the suggestion, but following Meillassoux's motif of ignorance as containing hidden knowledge, I could claim to have speculatively discovered the infinite, virtual multi-verse hidden behind us, or more accurately, awaiting us in the future to be smuggled into the past. The problem is not that we would be unable to take the scientific description of the new past literally, but that the description of the previous past would no longer exist as, if 34 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 53. 35 While the details would be too much for this essay, the reader should note that in Meillassoux's "The Spectral Dilemma" (Collapse 4), retro-causation is a possible interpretation for the effects of the coming into being of the previously virtual God in that by now existing, those who had died horrible meaningless deaths will no longer have died in vain. 36 See Price, "Does Time Symmetry Imply Retrocausation?" retro-causation is consistent, then all experiments which were carried out in and on the previous past would be altered to have produced the results consistent with the new past. Here the descriptions of the previous past would be scoured from history in the act of making consistent with the new laws of the hyper-chaotic event. While the scientist could breathe easy knowing that their experiments, if well designed, would still produce accurate results post reality-altering events and their publication count would likely remain intact, the ontological closing off of a perfectly real realm of the past should be unsettling. Essentially, this would amount to the previous past being radically removed from the possibility of a literal interpretation, despite it having been literally anterior to the new past.
Alternately, we could propose that retro-causation does not affect thought. It should be noted that this appears as the least probable option Meillassoux would take as it implies an ontological separation between thought and being, and despite Meillassoux's Cartesian alliances, there is no indication that he wishes to revive a mind-body dualism of any kind. However, because Meillassoux asserts the infinite power of speculation to think the world otherwise, and nothing about this situation breaks the law of non-contradiction (Meillassoux's only bulwark against nonsense), it is perfectly thinkable, and therefore a legitimate possibility to be considered, on Meillassoux's terms. In this case, we would have not one but at least two incompossible though perfectly literal descriptions of the past. We would have the description of the past before the hyper-chaotic event, the previous past, and of the past after the event. From our speculative viewpoint, we could see that both descriptions are perfectly acceptable descriptions of the anterior as such: both sets of phenomena, or both sets of physical laws would be equally true of their respective past. An interesting challenge to reference theories of truth lurks here, but must remain unexplored for now. However, given normal scientific practices, the description of the laws of the new past would come to dominate that of the previous past. Scientists would be completely justified in this as the evidence would be unilaterally on the side of the new description on a long enough timeline. This results in an impasse between the speculative philosopher and the scientist: either the new description of the past cannot be taken literally as the speculative philosopher must hold open the possibility that the current past is the result of a retro-causation replacing a previous past, or one must limit themselves to the scientific description despite the wide open possibilities of speculation. If we do not limit speculation, then the shift from Aristotle's physics to Newton's has every right to claim to be an actual ontological shift. We would thus have all the problems of the previous retro-causation account along with the added problem of a set of descriptions about the previous past which, to anyone but the speculative philosopher, we could only view as nonsense or junk science as the evidence would have been swept out from underneath them. In this methodological wedge driven between the scientist and the speculative philosopher, we see once again the failure of Meillassoux's practical guiding principle of philosophers literally interpreting the statements of science.
It must be said about both of these accounts of the possibility of retro-causation that they have assumed that the notion of the anterior still functions despite the actual alteration of the past, that one past could be distinguished from another despite one having replaced the other in the form of a making-consistent with an event posterior to it. However, I have not investigated the possibility that Meillassoux's past is like Hamlet's time, out of joint, because if the notion of the anterior does not hold, then we only have a correlated past in which the anterior is only definable in relation to its observers. This would amount to nothing less than a wholesale rejection of the chronological account of time in which time itself can be infinitely reordered without a reference to some "meta-time" in which to organize or recognize such reordering. Whereas the test of a hyper-chaotic event I used above being related to the interest of scientists is not a reduction of the past to the correlation because the notion of the ancestral as an absolute anteriority remains, denying the notion of absolute anteriority would shatter any hope of a non-correlated time. This would amount to Meillassoux failing his own criteria of being able to give a literal interpretation to scientific statements, and not because the statements themselves are contingent, but that the physical events those statements correlate to are radically contingent. It is possible on Meillassoux's account that a statement can have its referent pulled out from underneath it in an ontological sleight of hand to which we may have no epistemological access.
This brings to mind a short story by China Miéville in the form of a speculative syllabus for a class which explores the effects of the litter of time travelers on history and asks such questions as 'benches: what will they have been originally'?37 Perhaps these sort of projected but always delayed questions are the best we can hope for scientific practice in a hyper-chaotic universe, that even the origins of something we are well acquainted with cannot be truly known until the universe spins itself out, receiving a final truth value only after it is metaphysically impossible that any being be able to speak that truth. Yet this final resting place of the universe is an impossibility for Meillassoux as heat death is just as contingent as anything else,38 even if our statements about it may be taken at face value.
Conclusion
The inability to move from the mathematization of laws to the primary qualities of objects as well as the commitments the support of real laws imply for the ontology of hyper-chaos stands as a barrier to the great outdoors Meillassoux seeks. This is not a death knell for Meillassoux's coming system of thought; nothing here amounts to a diagnosis of a stillbirth. No argument given above shows an insoluble contradiction or a knockout argument against the principle of unreason. However, I have shown the reasons a traditional scientific realist and the ordinary practicing scientist should be hesitant about Meillassoux's project. In the spirit of his project, we can speculate at least three possible outcomes: 1 (which I would recommend) Meillassoux jettisons his realism about physical laws, which would amount to immanentizing the principle of unreason to be about things themselves, rather than transcendent entities (real laws) which pre-define what entities can and/or will do, however, this may entail a contradiction with Meillassoux's reliance on transfinite mathematics to reject totalization; 2, speculative materialism will be rigorously formulated in such a way as to support a direct justification for the mathematizability of entities in general, of which real physical laws would simply be a subset, thereby removing the hierarchy between laws and the entities they govern, but this is not-unproblematic either as it seems to imply the possibility that laws could change without a corresponding change in the various other entities of the universe or vice-versa; or 3, the practical functioning and day-to-day work of the hyper-chaotic scientist will be notably different from their traditional counterpart in such a way that makes the literal interpretation of scientific statements not conflict with any of the possible implications of hyper-chaos. While this last option is the most consistent with Meillassoux's stance, it remains the most difficult to predicate. What would such a scientist do? What philosophy of science would be adequate to make sense of their work? As Meillassoux's own work is still ongoing, for now we can only wait to see what is possible.
